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Abstract
Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether
wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth
aﬀects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We ﬁnd people bid more sincerely
in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere
bidding in hypothetical auctions.
Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation;
Hypothetical bias; Earned Money.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C3, D1.
1 Introduction
There has been a push in experimental economics to replace windfall wealth with earned wealth. Legit-
imize wealth with eﬀort has been shown to aﬀect people's behavior in experiments, especially in games
involving social preferences (i.e., self-interested people who also think about the payoﬀs and intentions of
others). For example, people who earned their wealth were less generous in games that involve resource
sharing, e.g., the dictator game.Evidence suggests people are less generous and less prone to take risks
when spending their own money (see Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002;
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Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren, 2005).1 The open question is whether earned wealth helps concentrate the
mind on being more rational or whether it simply reduces one's social preferences or both.
Herein we explore this question by examining whether earned wealth will aﬀect bidding behavior
in Vickrey (1961)'s classic demand-revealing second price auction. The second price auction is a good
case study on the origins of wealth because earlier experiments have observed risk taking and insincere
bidding behavior given windfall wealth (see the review by Kagel, 1995). Also the auction provides a
cleaner environment since it involves only private values; there is no mechanism to share wealth, which
eliminates social preferences from the story since a bidders' behavior is independent of the distribution
and behavior of the other players.
Our results suggest earned money matters in the auction mechanism, and in a particular way. Bidding
behavior was more demand-revealing and eﬃciency was signiﬁcantly greater for earned wealth relative
to windfall treatments. But this only held when monetary incentives also existed; earned wealth had
the opposite eﬀect on bidding behavior when the auction was non-binding.
2 The experiment
We use a 2×2 factorial design that focuses on two factors that aﬀect the external validity of experimental
decisions: earned versus windfall wealth and monetary versus hypothetical bidding in a second-price
auctionVickrey is the classic demand revealing auction to use in an experiment given it is straightforward
to explain, the weakly dominant strategy is to bid one's value, and the price is endogenously determined
by the bidders (Kagel, 1995). In all treatments in each period, one unit of an unspeciﬁed good is sold
on the auction. Exchange rules of the second-price auction are: the highest bidder wins and pays the
second-highest bidder's bid. An auction has 9 bidders each endowed with a unique induced value  i.e.
the price at which the bidder can sell the good to the monitor after the auction.
The induced demand curve is identical in all auctions and is deﬁned by: {84; 76; 71; 68; 65; 63; 53; 38; 24}.
All monetary values are expressed in ecu (Experimental Currency Unit). The auction is repeated over 9
periods, implementing all possible permutations between individual private values. Each bidder experi-
ences each private value once; and the entire demand curve is induced in every period.2 Bidders do not
know the other bidders' induced value or the induced demand curve. A bidding period ends when every
bidder has chosen a bid between 0 and 100. At the end of the period, each bidder is privately informed
about whether he or she won the auction (and the market clearing price if they won), their gain for the
period and whether a new auction round is about to start.
All four treatments followed the same design expect for the origin of the wealth and the consequences
of bidding. First, the windfall-hypothetical treatment (labeled wh) is our baseline. The windfall
wealth is a show-up fee of 10e . Second, in the Monetary incentives only treatment (wm), bidding
is now binding: auction earnings are translated into Euros given a common knowledge exchange rate
1In contrast, some researchers ﬁnd evidence that the origin of assets does not inﬂuence subject behavior in laboratory
settings (e.g. Clark, 1998, 2002; Rutström and Williams, 2000). But see Harrison (2007) for an alternative interpretation
of Clark's (2002) data.
2Although the repetition is deterministic, we avoid end-game eﬀect by providing the subjects with no information on
that point  except for the repetition itself.
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(3 ecu for 1 e ).3 In each round, the winning bidder's proﬁts equal the diﬀerence between his or her
induced value and the market price he or she pays for the good (the second highest bid). Proﬁts of the 8
non-winning bidders are zero.Only the winner sees the two highest bids at the end of the round. Overall
earnings of the subjects are computed as the sum of the resulting amount and the 10e show-up fee.
Third, we create the earned-wealth only treatment by adding an intermediate step to the baseline.
Following Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002); Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren (2005), in earned wealth-
only (eh) subjects earned their wealth by answering 20 questions of general interest. Each question
is presented sequentially, and each question has four possible answers among which one is correct.
Monetary earnings are proportional to correct answers. We selected the questions from the sheets used
by the French government to select some of its civil servants. This seems well suited to discriminate
between undergraduate students, since participation to the selection process is open only to holders of
the French baccalaureate. 4 Subjects learn their score and total earnings at the end ecu of this stage.
The payment rate is 2 ecu per correct answer (the exchange rate is again 3 ecu for 1 e ). Once all
subjects answer all questions, the Vickrey auction begins.
The ﬁnal treatment combines Monetary incentives with earned wealth (em). Bidding behavior
is now binding. The four experimental sessions were run in Paris, each involving 18 subjects.5 In each
session, subjects are separated into two distinct 9-bidder auctions, which provides two sessions for each
treatment. Participants were ﬁrst to third-year undergraduate students in law, economics or chemistry.
The experiment was computerized using a software developed under Regate (Zeiliger, 2000).
3 Results
We consider four indicators of sincere bidding behavior across the four treatments  aggregate bidding
and demand, individual bidding behavior, allocative eﬃcient, and surplus extracted.
First, we consider aggregate bidding behavior. Table 1 illustrates bidding behavior at the aggregate
level by induced value and treatment. We add up the bids and sort by induced value for each of the
treatments.
Under windfall wealth, we observe similar bidding behavior with and without monetary incentives,
e.g., no hypothetical bias in bidding. Strictly rational bidding in the monetary and hypothetical treat-
ments would result in the elicitation of 9756 ECU = 542 × 18. Adding up the bids for each induced
value, we see people tend to overbid, both with and without monetary incentives, 10328 ECU(105.9%
of the total demand) and 10134 ECU (103.9%). Unconditional mean test shows that bidding behavior
with or without monetary incentives are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.645).
A diﬀerent story emerges for the earned wealth treatments. Our results suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in bidding behavior with and without monetary incentives. Elicited demand reveals underbidding,
3Negative total earnings would decrease the show up fee up to 5e . This lower bound stems from the way participants
are recruited: we contractually commit ourselves to a minimum earning equal to 5e .
4The procedure is labeled Concours de Catégorie B de la fonction publique. Our source is http://pagesperso-orange.
fr/bac-es/qcm/annales_c02_r01.html.
5The two windfall sessions are taken from the original experimental plan of Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren
(2008a). The two earned money sessions are the ﬁrst two parts of a longer experiment described in Jacquemet, Joule,
Luchini, and Shogren (2008b).
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Table 1: Aggregate bidding behavior by group and induced value
Induced value 24 38 53 63 65 68 71 76 84 All
Ag. Demand (AD) 432 684 954 1134 1170 1224 1278 1368 1512 9756
Winfall wealth & Hypothetical
Revealed AD 626.0 808.0 1050.0 1193.0 1201.0 1192.0 1242.0 1290.0 1532.0 10134
Ratio RAD/AD 144.9% 118.1% 110.1% 105.2% 102.6% 97.4% 97.2% 94.3% 101.3% 103.9%
Monetary incentives only
Revealed AD 687.0 735.0 1078.0 1045.0 1318.0 1259.0 1281.0 1334.0 1591.0 10328
Ratio RAD/AD 159.0% 107.5% 113.0% 92.2% 112.6% 102.9% 100.2% 97.5% 105.2% 105.9%
Earned wealth only
Revealed AD 670.0 746.0 1045.0 1215.0 1205.0 1348.0 1334.0 1453.0 1479.0 10495
Ratio RAD/AD 155.1% 109.1% 109.5% 107.1% 103.0% 110.1% 104.4% 106.2% 97.8% 107.6%
Earned wealth & Monetary incentive
Revealed AD 492.0 678.0 816.0 1145.0 1121.0 1229.0 1260.0 1406.0 1490.0 9637
Ratio RAD/AD 113.9% 99.1% 85.5% 101.0% 95.8% 100.4% 98.6% 102.8% 98.5% 98.8%
Note. The ﬁrst row reports the induced values attributed to buyers. The second row reports the corresponding aggregate demand
in each treatment, i.e. induced values × number of subjects. For each treatment (four remaining rows), the upper part of the
row displays the aggregate revealed demand (i.e. the observed bids posted by buyers the induced value of whom are reported in
column). The bottom part reports the ratio of this revealed demand to the aggregate induced demand, in %.
9637 ECU (98.8%), with monetary incentives; and overbidding at 10495 (107.6%) without monetary
incentives. The diﬀerence in demand is statistically signiﬁcant, p-value p = .046 (unconditional mean
test).
Consider now each induced value in Table 1: it suggests bidding behavior under earned wealth
with monetary incentives performed relatively well at revealing demand in the aggregate. Results show
elicited demand matched the induced demand for all the induced values. Sincere bidding on aggregate
was similar for the other three treatments, except for the oﬀ-margin lowest induced value (24 ECU) in
which bids were more likely to exceed induced demand.
Second, we now examine the rationality assumption of perfect demand revealing bids. If each bidder
maximizes his or her private payoﬀ, each bid should equal the induced value. In wh, 16.7% of bids
are perfectly revealing; 46.9% of bids were within a 10 percent interval of the induced value (ν ± 0.1ν).
Insincere bidders both inﬂated and shave bids: 29.6% and 23.5%. Under wm, 5.5% of the bids are
perfectly revealing and 52.5% are in the 10 percent interval. Bidders tended to inﬂate their bids (33.3%)
rather than shaving them (14.2%).
Under em, 8.7% of the bidders bid sincerely and 43.8% were bidding within the 10 percent interval.
Here again, insincere bidders inﬂated their bids (38.9%) rather than shaved their bids (17.3%). Under
em, 20.4% of bidders gave their induced value and 63.6% bided within the 10 percent interval. Bidders
equally inﬂated and shaved their bids: 18.5% and 17.9%.
We test the assumption of perfect revealing bids by computing the ratio between the bid and the
induced value for each bidder. Rational sincere bidding implies a ratio of one, which is tested by
an equality test on the estimated intercept of the regression on a constant. We cannot reject the
null of rational bidding behavior for em (p = 0.812); in all other treatments, we do reject the null:
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wh(p = 0.034), wm (p = 0.039), and wh (p = 0.010). On average, earned money increased the
likelihood that a bidder would bid sincerely but only with monetary incentives in place; it had the
opposite eﬀect when bids were not binding.
Third, now consider allocative eﬃciencya second criterion of a well functioning auction. The auction
should allocate the good to the person who values it the most and he or she should pay the second highest
bid. We see the highest value bidder (with induced value of 84 ECU) won the auction the most frequently
in em: 61.1% of the auctions. This was greater than the other three treatments: wh, 44.4% (p = .504);
wm, 50.0% (p = .774); and eh, 22.2% (p = .043).
Strict eﬃciency implies the winner pays the second highest induced value. No treatment was par-
ticularly successful in this level of precision: 0% for both windfall wealth treatments; 5.5% for earned
wealth treatments. A weaker test is if the winner pays a price within the 10 percent interval around
this value.Here, em now performs signiﬁcantly better than the other treatments: 72.2% of all exchanges.
This compares to 27.8% for wh (p = .020), 33.3% for wm (p = .045) and 38.9% for eh (p = .094).
Finally, we examine average surplus extracted by bidders.A rational bidder would extract 8 ECU
after 9 periods (84ecu - 76ecu). Again emperformed signiﬁcantly better than the other treatments:
the average bidders broke about even with a surplus of -0.3ecu. The other treatments all resulted in a
substantial negative surplus signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in em: -13.4ecu for eh (p = .073), -14.3ecu
for wm (p = 0.04), and -23.4 for eh(p = 0.004).
Overall, based on our four indicators of sincere auction bidding, the most eﬀective treatment was
with earned wealth and monetary incentivesthe auction environment closest to the wilds. Earning
money and spending it for real seemed to concentrate the mind on the task at hand, which in our case
was bidding one's induced value in the second-price auction.
4 Concluding remarks
As noted by Bellman nearly ﬁfty years ago: in the physical world, in connection with testing and
experimentation, it is often useful to conceive of nature, in some vague anthropomorphic fashion, as
an opponent attempting to conceal the truth from us. The design of experiments may be conceived of
as a game in which we attempt to extract information from a stubborn, but fair, opponent (Bellman,
1957, p.283). Herein we ﬁnd that earned wealth matters in our experimental private value second-price
auction. Earned wealth with monetary incentives induced more sincere bidding and greater eﬃciency
relative to the classic windfall wealth treatment; and relative to the hypothetical bidding employed in
stated preference valuation surveys. Since our design did not allow social preferences to play a role in
behavior, earned wealth seemed to help concentrate the mind on the task at handrational bidding.
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A Supplementary material: Quiz questions
The four possible answers apppear just after the question. The wright answer is the ﬁrst one in the list.
In the experiment, the answers order is identical within sessions but randomized between sessions.
1. In what place did the delegates of the Tiers-Etat met, after the kind rejected the grievance books?
The salle du jeu de Paume, The National Assembly, In Versailles, The Senate
2. What is the name of the current Director of the International Monetary Fund?
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Alan Greenspan, Alain Juppé, Pascal Lamy
3. Who wrote Germinal ?
Emile Zola, Gustave Flaubert, Guy de Maupassant, Honoré de Balzac
4. What is the capital of Australia?
Canberra, Sydney, Perth, Auckland
5. Who is the writer who said l'enfer c'est les autres.
Jean paul Sartre, Gérard de Nerval, Boris Vian, Sacha Guitry
6. In France, in case of vacancy or impeachment, who decides in place of the President?
The President of the Senate, The Prime Minister, The President of the national Assembly, The
minister of justice Le Garde des Sceaux
7. What is the american state with the largest population?
Californie, Floride, New York, Texas
8. In the novel Travel over several far countries in the world, Gulliver discovers fantastique countries.
What is the speciﬁcity of people from Lilliput ?
There height is no more than six inches, All are giants, Their head is the one of an animal, They
are hugely rich
9. Who wrote L'Iliade et l'Odyssée ?
Homère, Socrate, Platon, Virgile
10. The date at which State and Church were separated is:
A law from 1905, Au Concordat de 1801, A law from 1889, To the Latran agreement in 1929
11. In chemistry, what are the letters used to symbolize the acidity of a liquid?
Ph, Na, Ca, Ba
12. Among the following writters, who would have been able to meet Jean-Jacques Rousseau ?
Voltaire, Baudelaire, Hugo, Zola
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13. It designates a word or sentence that says the same thing as what was said before. It is:
A pleonasm, An euphemism, A metaphor, An understatement
14. Before getting settled in Paris in 1944, the temporary government of the French Republic was:
In Alger, In Londres, In the free zone, In teh occupied zone
15. Who was the ﬁrst women to become prime minister (1991-1992) under François Mitterrand presi-
dency?
Edith Cresson, Simon Veil, Martine Aubry, A women has never occupied this position
16. Signed on 25 mars 1957, this treaty is the starting point of the European Economic Community
(CEE):
The Rome treaty, the Versailles treaty, The Paris treaty, The Maastricht treaty
17. The human body's constitution is. . .
60% of water, 20% of water, 40% of water, 80% of water
18. What is the new regulation introduced by the Schengen agreement?
the free circulation of people, The European ﬂag, The implementation of the Euro, The european
constitution project
19. In English, what is the meaning of Bless you !
[A vos souhaits] !, Sorry !, Good bye !, Thank you !
20. Who wrote: Les sanglots longs ; Des violons de l'automne ; Blessent mon coeur ; D'une langueur
monotone?
Verlaine, Baudelaire, Musset, Rimbaud
B Supplementary material: Experimental instructions
B.1 Instructions
[The instructions reported below are used for the Baseline treatment with earned money. The changes
implemented according to the treatment appears in brackets.]
You're involved in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount you will earn will
depend on your own decisions as well as the decisions of other participants.
Before starting the experiment, we will ask you to answer a few questions aimed at knowing you
better (your age, your gender, your work occupation, . . . ). All those informations as well as your
monetary earnings will be kept anonymous and conﬁdential.
[Computerized Administrative questionnaire answered at this point ]
Thank you.
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Experiment proceedings
[The text below is used only in earned money sessions. In Windfall sessions, all informations are
provided after the instructions for the quiz.]
The experiment involves two parts. The instructions describing the proceedings of each part will be
distributed and read aloud before each one.
How will you take your decisions?
Your screen is divided into three areas:
In the upper part are displayed all the information you need to take your decisions.
The middle part allows you to take your decisions, by pressing on the displayed buttons.
The bottom part reminds you with your past decisions and proﬁts..
Payment of your earnings
Your earnings during the experiment will be expressed in ecu (for Experimental Currency Unit). Those
earnings are converted into Euros according to the rate: 3 ecu = 1 e . A ﬁxed fee equal to 10e is added
to this payoﬀ. You will be paid privately the corresponding monetary payoﬀ in cash at the end of the
experiment.
For obvious scientiﬁc reasons, it is mandatory not to speak during the experiment. Unfor-
tunately, we will have to ask any participant not complying with this rule to leave the rule without any
opportunity to take potential earnings.
It is very important you understand the proceedings of the experiment. If you have any question,
please raise your hand, someone will come answering you. Thank you for following this rules.
Thank you for your participation.
[Earned money: the text below appears only in Earned money sessions. In winfall sessions, the
proceedings of the second part appear here.]
**************
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Proceedings for the first part
The ﬁrst part involves 20 rounds. At each round, you have to answer a question by choosing one
out of four possible answers. To choose an answer, click on the corresponding button. Only one out
of the four answers is correct.
• If the answer you choose is the correct one, your earning for this round is 2 ecu.
• If the answer you choose is not the correct one, your earning for this round is 0 ecu.
At the end of this part, a message displays your earnings in each round. Your payoﬀ in ecu for the
ﬁrst part is the sum over ecu you earned in each period. Press OK once you've read those informations.
**************
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Proceedings for the second part
At the beginning of this part, two groups involving 9 participants are made. Each participant
belongs to the same group during the whole part.
Overview. You will be participating in an auction in which you are buyer. Your have to oﬀer, at each
period, a price in ecu to buy a good. The experiment monitor will re-acquire this good from you. There
will be several rounds of bidding. The outcome of each auction in each round has no inﬂuence
on [Monetary incentives: directly inﬂuences] how much you will get paid at the end of
the experiment.
Each round proceeding
Each round has 8 steps.
Step 1. Each bidder looks at his or her resale value on his or her screen. We label resale value the price
in ecu the monitor will pay to buy back a unit of the good that is purchased in the auction. The
resale values of diﬀerent participants in a group can be diﬀerent. Once you looked at
your resale value, press the OK button;
Step 2. Each bidder then submits a bid in ecu to buy one unit of the good. To this matter, move the
scroll bar until you see the price you want to submit. Then press the OK button below the scroll
bar to conﬁrm your choice;
Step 3. The monitor ranks the bids from highest to lowest. In case of ties, the ranking is drawn randomly.
For instance:
n◦ 1 fs.l ecu Highest bid
n◦ 2 df.g ecu
n◦ 3 za.f ecu
n◦ 4 qs.a ecu
n◦ 5 qs.a ecu
n◦ 6 nj.h ecu
n◦ 7 hh.m ecu
n◦ 8 ht.t ecu
n◦ 9 ky.l ecu Lowest bid
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Step 4. The second highest bid (bid n◦2) determines the market price. In the above example, the second
highest bid is df.g ecu then the market price would be et df.g ecu:
n◦ 1 fs.l ecu
n◦ 2 df.g ecu Second highest bid: market price
n◦ 3 za.f ecu
n◦ 4 qs.a ecu
n◦ 5 qs.a ecu
n◦ 6 nj.h ecu
n◦ 7 hh.m ecu
n◦ 8 ht.t ecu
n◦ 9 ky.l ecu
Step 5. The buyer who bid the highest price (the buyer ranked n◦1) purchases one unit of the good at the
market price. In the above example the buyer who bid fs.l ecu purchases one unit of the good
that costs df.g ecu.
Step 6. Buyer n◦1 then sells the unit back to the monitor. The price of this transaction is the resale value
listed for that round on his/her screen. The proﬁt in ecu the bidder n◦1 earns for that round is
the diﬀerence between the resale value and the market price:
proﬁt = Resale value - market price
Important remark. You can have negative proﬁts: if you buy a unit of the good and the resale
value is less than the market price, your proﬁts will be negative.
Step 7. All bidders at or below the market price (buyers n◦2 to n◦9) do not buy anything, they make
zero proﬁt for that round.
Step 8. End of the round. You proﬁt in ecu in that round appears on your screen. Press the OK button
once you read it. On your screen appears whether: a new round is about to start; or the experiment
is over.
Earnings for the second part
Your payoﬀ in ecu for this part is set equal to 0 whatever your earnings at each period. [Monetary
incentives: your payoﬀ in ecu for this part is set equal to the sum of your earnings at each period.]
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B.2 Pre-experiment questionnaire
1. Groups are rematched in each round.
2YES 2NO
2. Each group involves participants.
3. At the beginning of each round, all participants belonging to my group are attributed the same
resale value.
2YES 2NO
4. When I make a bid, I can bid any amount I wish.
2YES 2NO
5. The market price is set by the bid of the highest bidder in my group.
2YES 2NO
6. If my bid is the highest bid and is equal to RR.U ecu and the second highest bid in my group is
GG.K ecu, then I buy the unit of the good.
2YES 2NO
If yes, I pay: for the good.
7. If I purchase a unit of the good and my resale value is greater than the market price, I will make
positive proﬁts.
2YES 2NO
8. The monetary payoﬀ I will be paid at the end of the experiment depends on the amount of ecu I
earned in the auction.
2YES 2NO
If you are surprised by some answers, please ask questions.
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